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**Unveiling Islamophobia:  
American Attitudes Toward Islam\***

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A growing set of indicators reveal potentially serious challenges to the integration of Muslim immigrants into mainstream American society, including widespread negative perceptions of Islam, efforts to prevent the building of mosques in suburban communities, and rising reports of harassment and violence toward Muslims. This paper explores variation in anti-Islam sentiment, or Islamophobia, drawing from two theoretical traditions linking prejudice to (a) religious beliefs and practices, and (b) perceived outgroup threat. The author examines whether religious factors such as church attendance and religious particularism, attitudes toward immigrants, fear of terrorism, and contact with Muslims can account for Islamophobia. These relationships are tested using responses from the 2003 Religion and Diversity Survey, a nationally representative telephone survey offering rich data on attitudes toward Muslims, religious beliefs and practices, and opinions concerning terrorism, immigrants, and national identity. The strongest predictors of Islamophobia turn out not to be fear of terrorism or church attendance, but religious particularism, nativist orientations, and lack of contact with Muslims.

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Although public opinion polls suggest more Americans had a favorable view of Muslims after the September 11 terrorist attacks than before (Royer 2002; Pew Research Center 2001; Pew Research Center 2003), Americans also increasingly associate Islam with violence, view Islam as having less in common with their own religion (Pew Research Center 2003), suspect Muslims of teaching their children to hate, and believe that Muslims value life less than others (CAIR 2004). Combined with efforts to prevent the building of mosques in suburban communities and rising reports of harassment and violence toward Muslims, these negative perceptions are part of a growing set of indicators that reveal potentially serious challenges to the integration of Muslim immigrants into mainstream American society.

The history of anti-Islam sentiment in the United States dates back at least as far as the Barbary Wars of the early 1800s (Majid 2003) and can be traced to the present day through debates over immigration and citizenship at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century (Moore 1995) and more recent incidents like the 1970s oil shocks, the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis, and the Pan Am 103 bombing. The events of September 11, 2001, however, may have done more than any previous event to accentuate Muslim otherness and bring home the threat posed by violent Muslim extremists. The attacks offered proof that individuals allied with Islam, however unorthodox and marginal, were living in the U.S. and seeking its undoing; for those suspicious that Muslim Americans represented a “fifth column,” this was all the confirmation they needed. Polls suggest that the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have increased anti-Islam sentiment in the U.S. even further; belief that Islam is a violent religion has increased among Americans since the onset of the Iraq War (Pew Research Center 2003).

September 11 and the “war on terrorism” have almost certainly contributed to higher levels of anti-Islam sentiment in the U.S., yet they have done so unevenly across the population. I seek to explain variation in this sentiment aided by two theoretical traditions linking prejudice to (a) religious beliefs and practices, and (b) perceived outgroup threat. Analyzing data from the nationally representative 2003 Religion and Diversity Survey, I consider how Christians’ particularistic beliefs, church attendance and views on immigrants and terrorism shape their attitudes toward Islam. I find strong evidence that the symbolic threat Islam poses to Christianity and the American way of life is a far more important predictor of Islamophobia than the fear of terrorism.

### **Islamophobia and Why it Matters**

Islamophobia is a neologism coined in the late 1980s that refers to unfounded hostility toward Islam.<sup>1</sup> While the term first appeared in print in 1991 in an American

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<sup>1</sup> A report by the Runnymede Trust elaborates on this definition, outlining eight key components of Islamophobia: (1) Islam is seen as a monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to change; (2) Islam is seen as separate and 'other'. It does not have values in common with other cultures, is not affected by them and does not influence them; (3) Islam is seen as inferior to the West. It is seen as barbaric, irrational, primitive and sexist; (4) Islam is seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism and engaged in a 'clash of civilizations'; (5) Islam is seen as a political ideology and is used for political or military advantage; (6) Criticisms made of the West by Islam are rejected out of hand; (7) Hostility towards Islam is used to justify discriminatory practices towards

magazine, its usage and conceptual development have occurred mostly in Europe. One of the earliest discussions of Islamophobia is a report produced in Great Britain by the Runnymede Trust. The report argues that anti-Muslim prejudice has grown to such an extent that a new word is needed to describe the phenomenon, just as “anti-Semitism” was coined earlier in European history to highlight anti-Jewish hostility (Runnymede Trust 1997:4). Other scholars have accepted the term but contend that Islamophobia is not so much a distinct form of religious prejudice as a type of cultural racism (Modood 1997; Purkiss 2003; Larsson 2005). In other words, it is not Islamic faith *per se* that is the target of hostility, but the values and cultural practices—even ethnic and national origins—associated with the religion that are objects of prejudice. While this interpretation is appealing, it would be premature to conclude that Islamophobia does not include a distinctly religious component without more empirical data from the U.S., the nation with the most ethnically diverse Muslim population in the world (Project MAPS and Zogby International 2001).

Critics have argued that the term Islamophobia is used to fend off legitimate criticism of Islam and stifle debate over Islamic regimes, and that it serves to reify the notion of there being one, homogeneous Islam (Halliday 1999). I acknowledge these critiques, but for the sake of this paper have decided to use the term, with one caveat. I am interested not only in whether Americans fear or hate Islam, but also whether they view Islam as strange and backward or have a negative impression of the faith in general. While these attitudes are implied in the Runnymede Trust definition of Islamophobia (see

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Muslims and exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society; (8) Anti-Muslim hostility is seen as natural or normal (The Runnymede Trust 1997).

note 1), I want to emphasize that I am concerned with a broader phenomenon than the “phobia” aspect of Islamophobia might convey. For this reason, I will use “anti-Islam sentiment” interchangeably with Islamophobia throughout the remainder of the paper.

Moving beyond semantics, what difference might Islamophobia make in the lives of Muslims? Research indicates that Muslim immigrants in the U.S. are more likely to feel alienated from community leaders, are less likely to vote, and earn lower incomes than Christians (Wuthnow and Hackett 2003). From Canada there is evidence that Muslim men suffer the highest earnings penalty of all religions and also display lower labor force participation, higher unemployment, and lower occupational status relative to Canadian Christians (Model and Lin 2002). While the situations in Canada and the U.S. cannot be equated, the authors of these two studies suggest that discrimination against Muslims and negative perceptions of Islam may be responsible for these deficits. This interpretation is consistent with Portes and Rumbaut's (1996) theory of immigrant incorporation, which identifies discrimination in the labor market as an important part of an immigrant's context of reception and therefore critical in determining trajectories of integration into mainstream society. As yet, we know very little about the factors that contribute to Islamophobia; identifying them will not only help students of religion and immigration better understand likely patterns of Muslim social integration, but may also facilitate policy-making aimed at promoting tolerance of diverse religious and cultural traditions.

## **Religious Sources of Islamophobia**

A familiar and still compelling starting place in discussions of the relationship between religion and prejudice is Allport's (1966) classic article, "The Religious Context of Prejudice." Its central theme is the paradox between religious teachings that implore love toward all and the well-documented tendency of religionists to display more intolerance and prejudice than their secular counterparts (Allport 1966:447). While careful not to overemphasize theological factors, Allport showed that alongside religious teachings on brotherhood, theological systems also have built-in invitations to bigotry. Most importantly, many religions lay claim to special knowledge gained through divine revelation. This doctrine not only legitimizes a religion's truth claims but typically challenges those of other religions and, in some cases, may lead the faithful to regard rival religious systems as a threat to human salvation (449).<sup>2</sup> This is how several prominent Christian leaders have portrayed Islam following the September 11 attacks. Franklin Graham, son of evangelist Billy Graham, called Islam a "very evil and wicked religion" and J. Don George, leader of Calvary Temple in Irving, Texas, declared those not proclaiming the lordship of Jesus to be fighting a war on the side of Satan (Barbee and Shaffer 2002).

Glock and Stark (1966) also argued that Christian beliefs were associated with prejudice, in their case anti-Semitism. They found evidence that doctrinal orthodoxy leads to religious particularism, which encourages hostility toward historical Jews and

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<sup>2</sup> This characterization is far more appropriate for Christianity, Judaism, and Islam than it is for Hinduism, Buddhism, and African traditional religions.

eventually produces anti-Semitic views toward modern Jews. While more recent studies of religion and ethnic prejudice in Europe have found the relationship between specific doctrines and ethnic prejudice to be largely spurious, the effect of religious particularism has remained central in explanations of attitudes toward ethnic outsiders (Konig, Eisinga, and Scheepers 2000; Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello 2002).<sup>3</sup> Quite simply, the theory predicts that people who consider their religion to be the only true religion are more likely to hold unfavorable opinions of religious outgroups. I expect to find the following:

*H1: Religious particularism is positively related to anti-Islam sentiment.*

Church attendance has also been linked to prejudice. In their review of research on religion and prejudice, Gorsuch and Aleshire (1974) concluded that the relationship between church attendance and prejudice is curvilinear, with non-attenders and very active attenders displaying lower ethnic prejudice than those who only moderately attend. This is the case, they argue, because moderate attenders are conforming to “the great American way of life,” a sentiment based on the hegemony of white Anglo-Saxon and Christian traditions in which both ethnic prejudice and some level of religious commitment are the norm (288). In other words, just as moderate attenders are more likely to participate in religious services to acquire communal identity or affirmation,

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<sup>3</sup> Recent studies of religion and prejudice in social and cognitive psychology (Laythe et al. 2002; Rowatt and Franklin 2004; Rowatt, Franklin and Cotton 2005) generally support this view. They go further by disaggregating doctrinal orthodoxy and fundamentalism (i.e., religious particularism) from right-wing authoritarianism, but reproducing these analyses are beyond the scope of this study.

what Allport calls “a token of churchmanship” (1966:454), they are also more likely to maintain the prejudicial social norms of the dominant social group. High-attenders and non-attenders, on the other hand, draw their values from traditions that tend to be more critical of dominant social norms, including ethnic and religious prejudice. The most frequent attenders are more likely to be attending church for intrinsic religious reasons and to be committed to ideals like the Golden Rule that run contrary to prejudice (Allport 1966:454-55). Lately, this theory has been challenged by findings suggesting that the relationship between church attendance and ethnic prejudice is actually linear (Eisenga, Felling, and Peteres 1990; Scheepers, et al. 2002), but the weight of theoretical and empirical evidence strongly favors a curvilinear relationship. I therefore expect to find the following:

*H2: Church attendance is curvilinearly related to anti-Islam sentiment.*

### **Nativism/Outgroup Threat**

Muslims are both religious and ethnic/national outsiders to the majority of Americans, making nativism and perceived outgroup threats particularly relevant to the study of anti-Islam sentiment. These threats can be classified as realistic or symbolic, and while the distinction between the two may allow for some overlap, the concepts are nonetheless useful for the present study. Realistic threats “concern threats to the political and economic power of the in-group, and threats to the physical or material well-being of the in-group or its members (e.g., their health)” (Stephan, Ybarra, and Bachman 1999: 2222). To speak of realistic threats, then, is to imply a broader range of concern than that of realistic conflict theory (*ibid*; cf. Quillian 1995) since realistic threats include any threat to the physical wellbeing of the in-group and its members, not just competition

over resources. The perception that Muslims in the U.S. pose a threat because they are likely to commit or facilitate acts of terrorism is an example of a realistic threat because the consequences of an attack would largely be material (e.g., loss of life, damaged infrastructure, economic costs). The theorized link to prejudice is straightforward: “The greater the threat that the out-group is perceived to pose to the in-group, the more negative the attitudes toward the out-group will be” (Stephan et al. 1999: 2222). Given the destruction on 9/11 and the media’s continuing focus on Islamist terror plots against the U.S., I expect the following:

*H3: Fear of another terrorist attack is positively related to anti-Islam sentiment.*

Symbolic threats are so named not because they are less real than realistic threats, but because the threatened objects are intangible entities such as morals, values, norms, standards, beliefs, and attitudes. In other words, one group may develop hostility toward another group because it challenges its cultural symbols, way of life or worldview (2223). Kathleen Moore (1995) has documented how Americans objected to Muslim immigrants entering the country at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century because they were known to practice polygamy, a way of life seen as threatening to the morality of American society and at odds with American culture.

Research on symbolic racism suggests that simply failing to support—let alone challenging—another group’s beliefs and values may be enough to invite prejudice and hostility (Biernat et al. 1996). In this sense, Muslims pose a potential symbolic threat to Christians simply by maintaining a different set of religious beliefs, whether or not

doctrine is ever argued face-to-face. This is another way of saying that the discussion of religious particularism can be recast in terms of symbolic threat.

A recent, pre-9/11 study of American attitudes toward immigration policy suggests that people who oppose policies benefiting immigrants are not only concerned about immigrants' threat to the economy, a realistic threat, but about their potential to damage national unity, a symbolic threat (Wilson 2001). This finding has been interpreted as a sign of insecurity regarding the perceived (negative) impact of immigrants on American culture. Because Muslims observe cultural traditions that may seem threatening to some Americans or at odds with the American way of life (e.g., arranged marriages, women wearing headscarves or veils, sex-segregated worship), I expect that:

*H4: Individuals with a low opinion of immigrants will maintain greater Islamophobia.*

*H5: Individuals with a high view of the American way of life will maintain greater Islamophobia.*

### *Education*

Researchers have consistently found that educational attainment is negatively related to prejudice and ethnic intolerance (Vogt 1997; Martire and Clark 1982). How this relationship works is still open to debate, but Selznick and Steinberg (1969) offer a compelling argument for prejudice's cognitive roots and the role of socialization in their study of anti-Semitism. They propose that prejudice is largely a function of cognition and that prejudicial beliefs are simplifications of social reality incorrectly generalized to all members of a particular group. Education is hypothesized to reduce prejudice by (1) providing knowledge that may help refute ethnic stereotypes, and (2) increasing "the

cognitive abilities necessary for a sophisticated analysis of problems in order to counterbalance the rigid simplifications inherent in most positive ingroup and negative outgroup attitudes” (Coenders and Scheepers 2003). Applying the “cognitive sophistication” approach to political tolerance, McClosky and Brill (1983) suggest “defending the civil liberties of outcasts, dissenters, criminals, or other marginal members of society ordinarily entails a more difficult and complex decision process than is involved in suppressing them” (pp. 18-19). I argue that this observation also applies to people consistently *portrayed* as criminals, which prompts consideration of how the ability to critically process popular representations of Muslims varies by educational attainment. In line with previous studies, I expect to find the following:

*H6: Educational attainment is inversely related to Islamophobia.*

*H7: Knowledge of Islam is inversely related to Islamophobia.*

### *Contact*

Allport (1954) argued that four conditions were essential for intergroup contact to reduce prejudice: equal status in the situation, common goals, intergroup cooperation, and support of the authorities. Pettigrew (1998) addresses problems with this hypothesis and its application, drawing from varied studies to propose a theory of how and why optimal contact is effective, not just when it is likely to occur. In doing so he reaffirmed Allport’s four conditions while adding a fifth: the contact situation must provide participants with the opportunity to become friends (76). This situation is critical because it reinforces the generation of affective ties, one of the key processes Pettigrew identified as a mediator between contact and prejudice. Intergroup experiences that generate

positive emotions can help reduce anxiety (71). Additionally, positive encounters that increase empathy toward individual outgroup members have been shown to improve attitudes toward the outgroup as a whole (Batson, Schoenrade, and Ventis 1993). I therefore expect the following:

*H8: Pleasant contact with Muslims is inversely related to Islamophobia.*

### *Race*

Race is an additional factor likely to be associated with Islamophobia. Islam played a significant role in the American civil rights movement and continues to play a role in urban neighborhoods and among African-American prisoners (Moore 1995). Additionally, a sizable percentage of Muslims in the U.S. are African American, perhaps more than 20 percent (Project MAPS and Zogby International 2001). African Americans, therefore, are more likely than whites to be familiar with Islam's tenets, to have had contact with its adherents, and to have seen it mobilized to promote positive social change. I expect to find the following:

*H9: African Americans will maintain lower levels of Islamophobia than whites.*

## **DATA**

I analyze data from the Religion and Diversity Survey, a nationally representative random-digit dial (RDD) telephone survey (N=2910) conducted between September 2002 and February 2003. The survey was designed by Robert Wuthnow of Princeton University in conjunction with the Responding to Diversity Project, sponsored by the

Lilly Endowment. The survey includes questions on attitudes toward Muslims, religious beliefs and practices, and opinions concerning terrorism, immigrants, and national identity (Wuthnow 2003). These data have been reported and analyzed elsewhere (Wuthnow and Cadge 2004; Wuthnow 2005), but it is worth recounting some details of the survey here.

Data from the Religion and Diversity Survey were gathered by SRBI Associates in New York from September 18, 2002 through February 25, 2003. A representative sample of telephone households in the continental U.S. was selected using a random digit dialing procedure, and interviewers asked to speak with the adult in the household, 18 or older, who had the most recent birthday. Interviews were conducted in English and in Spanish if the respondent preferred. Numerous measures were used to convert breakoffs and refusals into completed interviews, and all respondents were offered \$10 compensation. The response rate is 43.6 percent, which compares very favorably to other recent RDD surveys. The Pew Research Center (2004) reports a response rate of 27 percent for a typical RDD survey, although their respondents are not compensated, and the 2002 American National Election Study obtained a response rate of 35.2 percent (Burns, Kinder, and National Election Studies 2003).

I have limited my sample to respondents who self-identify as Christian. This identity was determined using a question that asked, “Do you consider yourself a Christian?” By excluding those who answered “no” (N=574) I have confined my analysis to a more relevant group of traditional Christians (evangelicals, mainline Protestants, Catholics, etc.) as well inclusivist and nontraditional Christians who nevertheless identify with the religion. This is desirable not only because there are few

adherents of each non-Christian faith in the sample from which to draw reliable conclusions, but because the literature on inter-religious conflict most commonly discusses rivalry between Christianity and Islam (Huntington 1993; Pipes 2002; Lewis 2003).

Finally, I dropped 56 cases from the sample due to missingness on dependent variable items and another 36 cases due to missingness on the religious preference variable. The result is a final sample size of 2244 cases.

## Outcome Measure

*Islamophobia* – I measure attitudes toward Islam using a scale created by summing responses to eight questions in the Religion and Diversity Survey. The items come from a cluster of questions that asked, “Please tell me if you think each of these words applies to the Muslim religion,” followed by five negative words (fanatical, backward, closed-minded, violent, strange) and three positive words (peace-loving, tolerant, appealing), all of which were randomly rotated. For all negative words, if a respondent said a word applied to Islam, he or she was coded as 2 on that item. “Don’t know” responses were coded as 1 and “No” responses were coded as 0. Responses for positive words were reverse-coded so that “No” equals 2, “Don’t know” equals 1, and “Yes” equals 0.<sup>4</sup> To form the Islamophobia scale I summed the eight items, producing a

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<sup>4</sup> Respondents who answered “Don’t know” were more likely to be female, age 45 and above, and less educated. Running the OLS analysis that follows without including these respondents has the effect of decreasing the *p*-value for the variable mainline Protestant

range of values from zero to 16 (alpha=.78). Thus, the most Islamophobic respondents scored 16 by rejecting all three positive descriptors and affirming all five negative descriptors.<sup>5</sup>

I also measure Islamophobia using a question that asked respondents how they would react to the following situation: “Suppose some Muslims wanted to build a large Muslim mosque in your community” (0=something you would welcome, 1=would not bother you, 2=would bother you a little, 3=would bother you a lot). This question was asked randomly of only half the sample, but it remains an important variable for a couple reasons. First, it will help assess the validity of the Islamophobia scale. I expect that predictors of scores on the scale will be reasonably similar to those predicting reaction to a mosque in one’s community. Second, the mosque item asks the respondent to consider a situation that could be perceived as posing a realistic threat.

## **Independent Variables**

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and increasing the *p*-value for female and Black Protestant. Overall, the effect is very slight.

<sup>5</sup> Constructing the scale using both positive and negative words is superior to using negative words alone. This is because some people give apparently contradictory responses. For example, 7.3% of the sample said Islam is both peace-loving and violent, while 13.4% said Islam is both tolerant and closed-minded. Given this ambiguity, albeit among a minority of the sample, it is sensible to disaggregate those who have entirely favorable or entirely unfavorable attitudes toward Islam. The eight-item scale makes this possible.

*Religious particularism*—I created a dummy variable to measure religious particularism using two items, the first of which asked respondents to agree or disagree with the following statement: “Christianity is the best way to understand God.” Respondents who agreed were asked, “Is Christianity the best way for you, or is it the best way for everybody?” I coded respondents who agreed with the first item and answered “everybody” to the second item as religious particularists (1=particularist, 0=otherwise).

*Religious attendance*—Attendance at religious services was measured by the question, “Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services...more than once a week, once a week, almost every week, once or twice a month, a few times a year, or never?” I combined “once a week” and “almost every week” to form one “weekly” dummy variable and coded the remaining responses into separate variables, leaving “never” as the reference category.

*Religious preference*—After dropping non-Christians from the sample I used the RELTRAD method (Steensland et al. 2000) to code the following religious affiliations as dummy variables: Evangelical Protestant, Mainline Protestant, Black Protestant, Catholic, Other, and Nonaffiliated (reference category).

*Religious knowledge*—I measured knowledge of Islam using two dummy variables derived from the questions, “In which religion is Ramadan a special time of fasting and prayer?” (1=Islam, 0=otherwise) and “As far as you know, do Muslims believe in the Ten Commandments, or not?” (1=yes, 0=otherwise).

Another religion variable included in the analysis is religious saliency, which was measured by the following two items, asking: “How important has it been to you as an adult to grow in your spiritual life?—not at all important, not very important, fairly

important, very important, or extremely important?” and “How much effort have you devoted to your spiritual life during the past year—none, hardly any, only a little, a fair amount, or a great deal?” Respondents who answered “extremely important” to the first item and “a great deal” to the second were coded “1” while all others were coded “0.”

*Nativist orientation*—I coded three dummy variables to measure attitudes toward immigrants and the United States that could be considered part of a nativist orientation. I used items from a set of questions that asked respondents to agree or disagree with the following statements: “Nothing in other countries can beat the American way of life” (1=agree, 0=otherwise), “Foreigners who come to live in America should give up their foreign ways and learn to be like other Americans” (1=agree, 0=otherwise), and “America owes a great deal to the immigrants who came here” (1=disagree, 0=otherwise).

*Worried about terrorism*—To measure fear of another terrorist attack I used the question: “How worried are you about the threat of another terrorist attack—extremely worried, very worried, somewhat worried, not very worried, or not at all worried?” I combined the first two responses to create a dummy variable for worried about terrorism (1=very/extremely worried, 0=otherwise).

*Contact with Muslims*—To measure the quantity and quality of contact with Muslims, I used the following two questions: “How much personal contact have you had with Muslims?” and “Have your contacts with Muslims been mostly pleasant, mixed, or mostly unpleasant?” I created a dummy variable to represent the highest, most positive level of contact (1=a great deal of mostly pleasant contact, 0=otherwise).

As for other independent variables, sex was coded as 1=female and age was divided into four categories: ages 18-24 (reference category), 25-44, 45-64, and 65 and up. Educational attainment was coded using three dummy variables, “some college,” “college graduate,” and “postgraduate work/degree,” with “never attended college” as the reference category. Dummy variables were coded for race (1=black, 0=otherwise) and ethnicity (1=Hispanic, 0=otherwise), as well as region of the country (west is reference category), and respondent’s community type—urban, suburban, and small town/rural (reference category). Additionally, the following variables were included in the analysis: travel (“Have you ever traveled or lived outside the United States?”), foreign born (“Were you born in the United States or another country?”), and parents’ education (“Did either of your parents graduate from college?”).

## RESULTS

I present descriptive statistics for the eight items comprising the Islamophobia scale in Table 1. Nearly half of the sample believes that the word fanatical applies to Islam and 40 percent think the word violent does. These figures are comparable to the 44 percent of Americans in another survey conducted around the same time who agreed that “Islam is more likely than other religions to encourage violence among its followers” (Pew Research Center2003).

[Table 1 about here]

Descriptive statistics for the Islamophobia scale, the reaction to a mosque item, and all independent variables are presented in Table 2.

[Table 2 about here]

Table 3 shows results of OLS regressions predicting scores on the 16-point Islamophobia scale (results of full models available on request). Model 1 includes only the religious factors designed to test Hypotheses 1 and 2. Contrary to Hypothesis 1, there is no evidence of a relationship, curvilinear or otherwise, between attendance and Islamophobia. None of the coefficients for religious attendance are statistically significant and the signs of the coefficients of infrequent attenders (i.e., monthly and yearly) suggest a pattern opposite that predicted. The effect of religious particularism, however, provides very strong support for Hypothesis 2, which predicted a positive relationship between particularism and anti-Islam sentiment. Those who believe Christianity is the best way for everybody to know God scored 2.5 points higher (.57 standard deviations) on the anti-Islam sentiment scale. In fact, religious particularism remains the strongest predictor of anti-Islam sentiment across all subsequent models, apart from Muslim contact in the final model. Likewise, the nonsignificant results for religious attendance are consistent across all models.

[Table 3 about here]

Model 2 introduces background variables such as age, sex, education, region of the country, and religious preference. The most important variables are the college graduate and postgraduate education variables, which lends strong support to Hypothesis 6. Those who have done postgraduate work score almost two points lower on the Islamophobia scale, while college graduates score 1.4 points lower than those who have never attended college. The effect of being African American is in the predicted direction and statistically significant at the .10 level, lending only limited support to Hypothesis 9. In terms of religious preference, evangelical and mainline Protestant

identity are both significant predictors of anti-Islam sentiment. That evangelical status should be associated with higher Islamophobia scores confirms similar findings in recent opinion polls (Pew Research Center 2003; Pew Research Center 2005), yet for this effect to hold even while controlling for attendance and religious particularism speaks to its robustness. Indeed, across Models 2-6 and in additional models that add controls for conservative theological views (not reported), evangelicals are consistently associated with scores roughly one point higher on the scale than those of nonaffiliated Christians. The coefficient for mainline Protestants in Model 2 is slightly smaller than that of evangelicals, and across the other models it fails to remain statistically significant at the .05 level.

I have included variables that test the effect of attitudes toward immigrants and the American way of life in Model 3. Those who agree that nothing in other countries can beat the American way of life maintain greater anti-Islam sentiment, as do those who agree foreigners should “give up their foreign ways and learn to be like other Americans” when they come to live in the U.S. People who disagree that America owes a great deal to the immigrants who came here score 1.3 points higher on the anti-Islam scale. These findings are consistent with Hypotheses 4 and 5, which predicted low opinions of immigrants and high opinions of the American way of life would both be associated with greater Islamophobia.

Model 4 introduces a dummy variable for those who say they are very or extremely worried about the threat of another terrorist attack against the U.S. As predicted in Hypothesis 3, being worried about another terrorist attack is associated with a higher score on the Islamophobia scale. However, the effect is not as large as that of

education, race, evangelical identity, religious particularism, attitudes toward immigrants, or attitudes toward the American way of life.

Turning to knowledge of Islam, Model 5 shows that correctly answering the Ten Commandments question is associated with a lower anti-Islam score while answering the Ramadan question correctly is not. This finding suggests the need to qualify the hypothesized relationship between knowledge of Islam and anti-Islam sentiment. It appears that knowledge of ritual or practice does not affect anti-Islam sentiment, while knowledge of values that link the respondent's religion (i.e., Christianity) with Islam does result in the expected outcome. One explanation might be that knowledge of Ramadan represents a much more superficial familiarity with Islam, a fact that can be picked up easily from the media, while information on Islamic values is harder to obtain. Indeed, half as many respondents correctly answered the Ten Commandments question as the Ramadan question (see Table 2). Although the survey does not include questions on the media or other sources of respondents' knowledge of Islam, it is possible to control for a respondent's self-reported familiarity with the basic teachings of Islam, which can serve as a proxy for cumulative exposure to Islam through the media, school, travel, *et cetera*.<sup>6</sup> However, adding a dummy variable to Model 5 that controls for being "somewhat familiar" or "very familiar" with Islam has no effect on the magnitude or significance of the Ramadan and Ten Commandments coefficients. This finding suggests that the differential effects of knowledge on Islamophobia are not merely byproducts of general familiarity with Islam.

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<sup>6</sup> The question reads, "How familiar are you with the basic teachings of...Islam? Are you...very familiar, somewhat familiar, somewhat unfamiliar, very unfamiliar?"

An alternative explanation centers on the theological implications of Islam sharing traditional values with Christianity. To explore this further, I ran interaction models (not reported here) using all the controls of Model 5 to determine how the effect of knowing that Muslims believe in the Ten Commandments varies across Christian traditions. Evangelical Protestants who answered the question correctly scored .34 points lower than other evangelicals ( $p < .05$ ), while adherents of other Christian traditions who answered the question correctly scored 1.49 points lower than their co-religionists. In other words, knowing that Muslims believe in the Ten Commandments makes little difference in the Islamophobia scores of evangelicals. In a separate model exploring the same effect among mainline Protestants, mainliners who correctly answered the question scored 1.99 points lower than other mainliners ( $p < .10$ ), while all other Christians who answered correctly scored only .89 points lower than those who answered incorrectly. Here, the effect of knowing that Muslims believe in the Ten Commandments is much stronger if the respondent was a mainline Protestant. This marked contrast between evangelical and mainline Protestants, which holds even when controlling for educational attainment, attendance, religious particularism, and all the other variables in Model 5, suggests that theological commitments do in fact mediate the effect of knowledge on anti-Islam sentiment.

Model 6 introduces the effect of prior contact with Muslims. As expected, pleasant contact with Muslims is indirectly related to Islamophobia. Moreover, this variable emerges as the strongest predictor of Islamophobia in the entire analysis. Respondents who report a great deal of mostly pleasant contact register Islamophobia scores that are 2.65 points—.59 standard deviations—lower than those of other

respondents. When additional dummy variables are created for lesser amounts of mostly pleasant contact—"a fair amount" and "only a little"—the effect of positive contact is even more pronounced. In a model (not reported) that includes these three contact variables and all the controls of Model 6, Islamophobia scores are 3.52 points lower for "a great deal," 2.15 points lower for "a fair amount," and 1.86 points lower for "only a little" (all three coefficients are significant at  $p < .001$ ). The next most important variable is religious particularism with a coefficient of 1.73 ( $p < .001$ ).

The models in Table 4 report the effects of the same variables just considered, but here I have used logistic regression to predict the likelihood of being bothered by Muslims building a large mosque in one's community. For the most part the results are very similar to those in Table 3. Religious particularism is the strongest predictor in all models, increasing the odds of being bothered by 270% in the full model. Attending religious services more than once a week is significant at the  $p < .05$  level in Models 1 and 6, and at the  $p < .10$  level in Models 3, 4, and 5. According to the full model, the odds of the most frequent attenders being bothered by a mosque are 174% greater than those of all other respondents. This finding lends no support to Hypothesis 2, yet it does suggest attendance plays some role in Islamophobia after all. Variables representing a nativist orientation have similar effects on attitudes toward a mosque as they did on Islamophobia scores, but believing that nothing beats the American way of life is not as important or robust relative to the other measures as it was in the OLS analysis. Believing that foreigners should give up their foreign ways is the most powerful predictor among the nativist variables, increasing the odds of being bothered by a mosque 203% in the final

model. The Ten Commandments and Ramadan variables again reveal a pattern suggesting the importance of different kinds of knowledge about Islam.

[Table 4 about here]

Surprisingly, Models 4, 5, and 6 show that being worried about another terrorist attack does not significantly increase the likelihood of being bothered by a mosque in one's community. This is counterintuitive because it suggests that fear of a possible realistic threat might not manifest itself even when a symbol of that threat enters one's locality (at least not when people *imagine* the situation). However, it should be noted that the direction of the coefficients in each model is consistent with the predicted relationship between fear of terror and anti-Islam sentiment.

There are two very striking results in the effects of background variables in Table 4. First, being African American is negatively associated with being bothered by a mosque, a finding predicted in Hypothesis 7. The size of this effect is relatively constant across the models until the contact variable is added in Model 6 and the Black coefficient decreases by 9 percent. This finding supports the argument that it is African Americans' greater contact with Muslims relative to whites' that contributes to lower levels of anti-Islam sentiment.

Second, education is a much weaker predictor of reaction to a mosque than scores on the Islamophobia scale. In Model 3, those who attended some college and those with college degrees were not significantly different from those who never attended college; by Model 5 *none* of the educational attainment categories appear to significantly affect reaction to a mosque in one's neighborhood. This is only partly explained by the addition of religious knowledge and contact variables in Models 5 and 6, respectively.

Finally, pleasant contact with Muslims has the predicted effect on attitudes toward a mosque. While the statistic reported in Table 4 does not stand out as much as its counterpart in the OLS analysis, it should be noted once again that if dummy variables are included in the model for lesser amounts of pleasant contact with Muslims, the effect is considerably more pronounced. In a model combining all three dummies and relevant controls, the log odds for “a great deal” of pleasant contact are -1.13, -.91 for “a fair amount,” and -.70 for “only a little” ( $p < .001$  for all).

## DISCUSSION

These results provide a much clearer picture of the context of reception facing Muslim immigrants in the United States today. Christian particularism must be recognized as a major factor in determining attitudes toward Islam, but my results also underscore the importance of anti-immigrant biases; Islam suffers not only for being non-Christian, but also for being perceived as un-American. While I cannot rule out the possibility that both of these views are rooted in the same psychological disposition, such as right-wing authoritarianism or social dominance, the correlation between religious particularism and any one of the three nativism variables never exceeds .12. Those who believe that Christianity is the best way for everybody to know God are the most likely to think poorly of Islam and to be bothered by a mosque in their neighborhood. This is in accordance with Allport’s theory that most religions teach some kind of exclusivity that may contribute to outgroup prejudice. Although he suggested religious particularism was becoming less of a factor in determining prejudice, he was writing immediately after immigration laws were changed but well before a critical mass of followers of non-

Western religions would migrate to the U.S. Perhaps the increase in religious diversity helped set the stage for increasing tensions among faiths.

Surprisingly, religious attendance was not significant in the OLS analysis of Islamophobia scores and significant only for very frequent attenders vis-à-vis reactions to a mosque. Although crosstabulations reveal a nearly linear positive relationship between religious attendance and reaction to a mosque being built in one's community, regression models suggest this relationship can be explained by the higher rate of attendance among religious particularists. Perhaps another reason attendance is not robustly associated with anti-Islam sentiment is that the variable does not reveal a church's orientation toward religious outgroups.<sup>7</sup> Churches vary in their stances toward ecumenism and interfaith dialogue; sermons and Sunday school programs on other faiths may be designed to facilitate proselytizing, but they can also be geared toward promoting understanding and

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<sup>7</sup> The Religion and Diversity Survey offers a wide array of items that measure respondents' participation in church activities such as programs that teach people how to tell non-Christians about Jesus, interfaith worship services and volunteer opportunities, and study groups on non-Christian and non-Jewish religions. While it is instructive to examine correspondence between participation in these activities and levels of Islamophobia, there are limitations to interpreting what this tells us about a respondent's church *per se*. For instance, although attendance is positively correlated with participation in evangelism training programs or activities, this clearly does not mean that the churches of the most frequent attenders are necessarily more interested in evangelism than the churches of less frequent attenders; frequent attenders may simply have higher rates of participation in these programs because they are at church more often.

partnership among followers of different religions. Whatever the case, this interpretation does not mean the church and its programs necessarily play the causal role in shaping churchgoers' attitudes towards Muslims; these churchgoers may simply have chosen to attend a church boasting an outlook that matched their preexisting attitudes (Gorsuch and Aleshire 1974).

The current results make clear that Islamophobia is not just about religion, it is also about immigration and the perception of "otherness." A nativist orientation is clearly linked to higher anti-Islam sentiment, suggesting that Islam stands out in respondents' minds as especially foreign. As mentioned earlier, this finding has a history that dates back at least to the late 19<sup>th</sup> century when Americans viewed Muslims as immoral and barbaric for practicing polygamy.

Another interesting and somewhat counterintuitive finding is that although fear of a terrorist attack is significantly related to maintaining greater anti-Islam sentiment when measured with the scale, it appears to be nonsignificant in predicting reactions to a mosque in one's neighborhood. Perhaps this finding is a reflection of Americans' different attitudes toward Muslims and Islam. Polls have consistently shown that Americans have a more negative view of Islam than of Muslims, especially "American Muslims" (Royer 2002; Pew Research Center 2003; Pew Research Center 2005). While it is reasonable to expect an Islamophobic respondent to be bothered by the presence of a nearby mosque, the survey question invites consideration of real people, not just an abstract religion as in the questions used to form the Islamophobia scale. It may be easier for a respondent who fears another terrorist attack to think negatively about Islam, given its reputed connections to terrorism, than about potential neighbors who happen to be

Muslim. But then should we expect all people to offer less Islamophobic responses to the mosque situation? Not necessarily. This would not be the case for a staunch nativist who resents Islam as an un-American religion *and* its local expression for providing evidence of resistance to assimilation. This is supported by the strength of the “give up foreign ways” variable reported in table 4.

While the current results indicate education plays a significant role in reducing anti-Islam sentiment, the finding concerning knowledge of Islam demonstrates that not all knowledge has the same effect. Knowing that Muslims believe in the Ten Commandments affects respondents differently depending on their religious preference, suggesting that theology may play a role in religious prejudice after all. In these results, evangelicals appear to be the least willing to temper their attitudes toward Islam even when they know that both Christians and Muslims believe in at least some of the same ethical principles. This makes perfect sense given evangelicals’ strong commitment to belief in Jesus as a personal savior; so long as Muslims disagree on that fundamental point, it is nearly irrelevant that they share general values in common. Mainline Protestants, on the other hand, are theologically more liberal and no doubt more open to affirming Islam for its shared ties to the Judeo-Christian tradition.

Finally, pleasant contact with Muslims emerges as a very strong predictor of Islamophobia—the greater the amount of contact, the lower the level of Islamophobia. Naturally, these results do not provide conclusive support for the role of contact; those hostile to Islam may be more likely to describe whatever contact they have with Muslims as unpleasant. Although cross-sectional data is ill-suited to answer questions of causality, path analysis has shown repeatedly that even though prejudiced people are more likely to

avoid contact, the effect of contact back on prejudice has an even stronger effect. Longitudinal studies and studies in which participant choice regarding contact was severely limited also support the view that contact, given the right conditions, reduces prejudice (see Pettigrew 1998 for a review).

As for the present sample, logistic regression results (available on request) indicate race is the strongest predictor of frequent pleasant contact with Muslims; the odds of blacks having had such contact are 353% higher than those of whites. Education variables are also very strong, positive predictors, while the elderly are much less likely than younger Americans to report pleasant contact with Muslims. None of the religious preference variables are statistically significant in predicting pleasant contact with Muslims. If it were true that the more Islamophobic respondents tend to describe their contact with Muslims as unpleasant, evangelicals should have been less likely to report pleasant contact, but this is not the case. The Religion and Diversity Survey offers more items pertaining to contact, and the matter will be addressed in greater detail in future work.

## **CONCLUSION**

In this paper I have used new data with rich measures of individual religiosity and attitudes toward religious diversity to explore the root causes and contours of Islamophobia in the U.S. I find that religious particularism and nativism play a large role in shaping patterns of hostility toward Islam and that education and pleasant contact with Muslims are crucial to lessening such negativity. I believe these results have at least two larger implications, one for how Islamophobia should be conceptualized, and another regarding the context of reception confronting Muslim immigrants in the U.S.

First, there is a religious component to American Islamophobia that should not be downplayed by attempts to portray Islamophobia as cultural racism (cf. Modood 1997; Purkiss 2003; Larsson 2005). I have affirmed earlier theorizing by Allport (1966) and Glock and Stark (1966) on the importance of religious particularism as it relates to prejudice, not unaware that accounting for Islamophobia in such a way runs the risk of advancing a truism, since it is hard to imagine how Christians convinced of the superiority of their own faith could not but look down on other religions. However, by calling attention to the critical role of religious particularism and evangelical identity in the case of Islamophobia, I aim to show that religion and even particular theological traditions are not simply standing in for other explanatory variables.

Second, although it is still unclear how Islamophobic rhetoric and behavior are altering Muslim incorporation into American society, there are early indications of mostly negative outcomes (Jamal 2004; Wuthnow and Hackett 2003). That Islamophobia is the manifestation of an unavoidable and intractable “clash” appears doubtful in light of findings that suggest education and pleasant contact with Muslims is associated with less anti-Islam sentiment, even among evangelicals. Nevertheless, religious particularism and nativism are undergirded by such a wide range of institutions that it is reasonable to predict American attitudes toward Islam will not improve significantly in the foreseeable future. Much further research is required to gauge the durability of Islamophobia and its impact on an increasingly heterogeneous Muslim immigrant population.

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**Table 1.** Descriptive Statistics of Islamophobia Scale Items

<i>“Please tell me if you think each of these words applies to the Muslim religion...”</i>	Yes	No	Don’t Know	Total %	N
Fanatical	47.0	38.2	14.8	100.0	2244
Violent	40.1	47.5	12.4	100.0	2244
Backward	34.8	50.7	14.5	100.0	2244
Closed-minded	58.3	29.1	12.6	100.0	2244
Strange	45.1	45.2	9.7	100.0	2244
Peace-loving	39.7	45.8	14.5	100.0	2244
Tolerant	30.9	54.2	14.8	100.0	2244
Appealing	14.6	72.1	13.3	100.0	2244

Source: Religion and Diversity Survey.

**Table 2.** Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent and Independent Variables

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
<i>Dependent Variables</i>				
Islamophobia scale	9.01	4.47	0	16
Reaction to mosque in neighborhood	1.49	.94	0	3
<i>Independent Variables</i>				
Religious particularism	.25	.43	0	1
Attend more than once a week	.18	.38	0	1
Attend weekly	.35	.48	0	1
Attend monthly	.17	.37	0	1
Attend yearly	.21	.41	0	1
Never attend	.09	.29	0	1
Spiritual life very salient	.23	.42	0	1
American way of life best	.73	.44	0	1
Foreigners should give up foreign ways	.47	.50	0	1
U.S. does not owe immigrants	.21	.41	0	1
Worried about terrorist attack	.32	.47	0	1
Muslims believe in Ten Commandments	.19	.39	0	1
Ramadan part of Islam	.41	.49	0	1
Contact with Muslims (great deal, pleasant)	.04	.19	0	1
Female	.61	.49	0	1
Age	46.0	17.3	18	91
Black	.12	.33	0	1
Hispanic	.10	.29	0	1
Foreign born	.07	.26	0	1
Northeast	.17	.38	0	1
South	.40	.49	0	1
Midwest	.26	.44	0	1
West	.17	.38	0	1
Urban	.17	.37	0	1
Suburban	.38	.48	0	1
Small town/rural	.44	.50	0	1
No college	.33	.47	0	1
Some college	.26	.44	0	1
College graduate	.26	.44	0	1
Postgraduate	.11	.32	0	1
Parent has college degree	.31	.46	0	1
Spiritual life very important	.23	.42	0	1

Source: Religion and Diversity Survey. N=2244

**Table 3.** OLS Regression of Scores on the 16-Point Islamophobia Scale on Selected Independent Variables (Religion and Diversity Survey)

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<i>Religious Factors</i>						
Attend >weekly	-.224 (.374)	-.602 (.393)	-.565 (.380)	-.542 (.380)	-.507 (.379)	-.385 (.376)
Attend weekly	.470 (.332)	.337 (.339)	.146 (.329)	.147 (.328)	.138 (.327)	.211 (.325)
Attend monthly	-.105 (.368)	-.210 (.368)	-.303 (.356)	-.305 (.356)	-.346 (.355)	-.244 (.353)
Attend few times a year	.022 (.352)	-.130 (.349)	-.250 (.338)	-.255 (.337)	-.289 (.336)	-.242 (.334)
Religious particularism	2.553*** (.223)	2.133*** (.229)	1.844*** (.223)	1.838*** (.223)	1.841*** (.222)	1.837*** (.220)
<i>Nativist Orientation</i>						
American way of life best	--	--	.755*** (.206)	.747*** (.206)	.712*** (.205)	.727*** (.204)
Give up foreign ways	--	--	1.634*** (.187)	1.633*** (.187)	1.591*** (.186)	1.556*** (.185)
U.S. doesn't owe immigrants	--	--	1.312*** (.227)	1.299*** (.227)	1.249*** (.227)	1.212*** (.225)
Worried about terrorist attack	--	--	--	.405* (.190)	.370 (.143)	.399* (.188)
<i>Knowledge of Islam</i>						
Ten Commandments	--	--	--	--	-1.141*** (.228)	-1.090*** (.226)
Ramadan	--	--	--	--	.061 (.189)	.140 (.188)
Muslim contact (high, positive)	--	--	--	--	--	-2.650*** (.464)
<i>Background variables</i>						
Black	--	-.741 (.401)	-.890* (.391)	-.881* (.391)	-.825* (.389)	-.592 (.389)
Some college	--	-.146 (.237)	.050 (.230)	.058 (.230)	.068 (.229)	.127 (.228)
College grad	--	-1.403*** (.253)	-.983*** (.248)	-.976*** (.248)	-.940*** (.248)	-.875*** (.247)
Postgraduate	--	-1.836*** (.331)	-1.193*** (.324)	-1.173*** (.324)	-1.066** (.326)	-1.029** (.323)
Evangelical Protestant	--	1.149** (.368)	.874* (.357)	.891* (.356)	.876* (.355)	.832* (.352)
Mainline Protestant	--	.835* (.397)	.686 (.384)	.692 (.384)	.698 (.382)	.683 (.379)
Black Protestant	--	.815 (.553)	.633 (.536)	.607 (.536)	.580 (.534)	.420 (.531)

Catholic	--	.391 (.371)	.104 (.359)	.100 (.359)	.065 (.357)	.009 (.355)
Other (Christian)	--	-.219 (.497)	-.424 (.482)	-.420 (.481)	-.427 (.479)	-.474 (.476)
<i>Constant</i>	8.257*** (.292)	6.865*** (.531)	5.483*** (.534)	5.418*** (.534)	5.646*** (.538)	5.663*** (.534)
<i>N</i>	2,244	2,244	2,244	2,244	2,244	2,244
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.065	.122	.178	.180	.189	.201

Note: Data shown are regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in Models 2-6 but not shown are age, sex, U.S. nativity, region, community type (urban, suburban, rural), parent's education, importance of spiritual life, and traveled or lived abroad.

\**p*<0.05; \*\**p*<0.01; \*\*\**p*<0.001 (two-tailed tests).

**Table 4.** Log Odds From the Logistic Regression of Reaction to Mosque in One's Neighborhood on Selected Independent Variables (Religion and Diversity Survey)

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<i>Religious Factors</i>						
Attend >weekly	.560*	.434	.475	.485	.527	.555*
	(.254)	(.271)	(.274)	(.274)	(.276)	(.276)
Attend weekly	.377	.281	.176	.183	.215	.229
	(.213)	(.231)	(.234)	(.235)	(.235)	(.236)
Attend monthly	.222	.243	.212	.231	.223	.252
	(.236)	(.250)	(.251)	(.252)	(.252)	(.253)
Attend few times a year	.366	.301	.248	.249	.267	.277
	(.223)	(.233)	(.235)	(.235)	(.236)	(.236)
Religious particularism	1.155***	1.045***	.973***	.971***	.997***	.994***
	(.143)	(.151)	(.153)	(.153)	(.154)	(.154)
<i>Nativist Orientation</i>						
American way of life best	--	--	.286*	.286*	.250	.257
			(.138)	(.138)	(.139)	(.139)
Give up foreign ways	--	--	.721***	.719***	.714***	.708***
			(.126)	(.126)	(.126)	(.126)
U.S. doesn't owe immigrants	--	--	.403**	.402**	.375*	.372*
			(.147)	(.147)	(.148)	(.148)
Worried about terrorist attack	--	--	--	.201	.166	.182
				(.128)	(.129)	(.157)
<i>Knowledge about Islam</i>						
Ten Commandments	--	--	--	--	-.622***	-.611***
					(.150)	(.150)
Ramadan	--	--	--	--	-.116	-.091
					(.125)	(.125)
Contact with Muslims	--	--	--	--	--	-.755*
						(.313)
<i>Background variables</i>						
Black	--	-.781**	-.849**	-.847**	-.802**	-.728**
		(.269)	(.275)	(.275)	(.278)	(.280)
Some college	--	-.206	-.165	-.157	-.141	-.113
		(.155)	(.156)	(.157)	(.156)	(.157)
College graduate	--	-.454**	-.309	-.298	-.240	-.205
		(.158)	(.159)	(.159)	(.161)	(.162)
Postgraduate degree	--	-.667**	-.446*	-.434*	-.361	-.354
		(.216)	(.219)	(.219)	(.222)	(.222)
Evangelical Protestant	--	.482*	.433	.448	.410	.401
		(.240)	(.243)	(.243)	(.244)	(.244)
Mainline Protestant	--	.259	.225	.224	.213	.206
		(.259)	(.262)	(.262)	(.262)	(.262)
Black Protestant	--	.578	.590	.585	.550	.517
		(.366)	(.370)	(.370)	(.372)	(.372)
Catholic	--	.270	.221	.219	.171	.157
		(.244)	(.246)	(.245)	(.247)	(.247)
Other (Christian)	--	-.264	-.239	-.232	-.302	-.315

		(.333)	(.337)	(.337)	(.338)	(.339)
_cut1	-1.342	-.803	-.308	-.277	-.511	-.512
	(.198)	(.341)	(.356)	(.356)	(.364)	(.363)
_cut2	.862	1.515	2.091	2.126	1.931	1.945
	(.193)	(.343)	(.361)	(.362)	(.368)	(.367)
_cut3	2.226	2.950	3.569	3.606	3.423	3.440
	(.205)	(.352)	(.371)	(.372)	(.377)	(.377)
Log likelihood	-1347.396	-1307.212	-1280.547	-1279.319	-1269.496	-1266.577
Pseudo $R^2$	.034	.063	.082	.083	.090	.092
N	1078	1078	1078	1078	1078	1078

Note: Data shown are regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in Models 2-6 but not shown are age, sex, U.S. nativity, region, respondent's community type (urban, suburban, rural), parent's education, importance of spiritual life, and ever traveled or lived abroad.

\* $p<0.05$ ; \*\* $p<0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p<0.001$  (two-tailed tests).